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Introduction
The testimony and proceedings of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission are voluminous and instructive. They mark the
first time in modern South Africa's history that an official body has
encouraged people to speak freely about recent events and to speculate how
the violent excesses of the past might instruct the creation of a better,
more democratic society. It must be one of the first times that a modern
sca:e has frankly admitted that the prerequisites of a truly just society
.•nay r.ot already exist.
These frank admissions have also encouraged discrete groups of people
c; assume a certain smugness about the authoritarian single-mindedness of
the apartheid and segregation eras. Much like people of another time who
admired Mussolini and the Italian fascists because they appeared to make
Italy's trains run on time, some still believe that there was a measure of
r;~.~onpiace virtue in the certainties of the recent past.
Political virtue, however, is never commonplace. It requires more
-cursge than force to maintain. It demands a degree of skepticism about
.actives, interests and outcc.T.es that authoritarian governments find
disturbing. Skepticism of this sort soon became the hallmark of the
Tr-^th and Reconciliation Commission iTRCi . The TRC aimed to establish a
process for democratic procedure-- one in which its sustained inquiry about
motives and intent would be focussed on the former South African state and
its opponents. But could this high-minded charge hold up under wide
ranging and numerous accounts of atrocities and state terror?
I propose to examine how the testimony of ordinary African witnesses
frcm the former districts of Marico and Rustenburg, and also from the
fictional political convention cf Bophuthatswana enabled the TRC to pursue
its expanded charge of "establishing as a complete a picture as possible of
the causes, nature and extent of the gross violations of human rights which
were committed during the period from 1 March 1960, including the
antecedents, circumstances, factors and context of such violations". In
conformity with my peculiar way of making a living, I will place my
greatest emphasis on the "antecedents".
The Unravelling: The State of Emergency
In 1984, after nearly eight years of popular protest, President p.w.
Botha declared a countrywide s tate of emergency. Twc years lacer Bctha's
regime declared i t s intention to incorporate Leuuwfontein and Braklaagte,
two of Rustenburg and Marico's most notable "black spots", into the
fictional s tate of Boputhatswana. Local and t r ibal councils of the
Baphokeng and Bafarutshe Tswanas began to recast themselves as Defense
Ccmmi-tees and actively soughc to identify themselves with the ba.-.ned
African National Congress (AMC) , the United Democrat!; Frcnt i'JD=" , and
Peoplas' Progressive Party (PPP).
On 10 February 1988, their actions and related popular
precast briefly overthrew the administration of Lucas Mar.gope
in Bcputhatswana. Mangope was restored tc effice 15 hours
later by battalions and paratroopers or the South Africa."
Defense Force (SADF) and the conspicuous appearance cf ?.W.
Botha, General Adriaan Vlok, the South African Minister of
Police, and General Magnus Malan, the Commander-ir.-Chief of
the SADF. In March 1990 Walter Sisulu of the ANC described
the subsequent armed confrontations and protests as a "popular
revolt". On 29 December 1990 the murder of Glad Mokgatle,
Lucas Mangope's subaltern in Phokeng, constituted a
determining moment in the protracted conflict.
Four years later, on the eve of South Africa's April 1994
elections, local Africans in Mmabatho, the fictional capital
of the equally fictional Eophuthatswana (Bop), seized local
radio and television stations. Civil servants, who had
defended Bop's president, Lucas Mangope, and his Christian
Democratic Party against the earlier accusations of local
members of the African National Congress (ANC), stayed away
from their offices for weeks at a time.
When panic stricken white farmers from Krugersdorp,
Marico and Rustenburg showed up in AWB drag, ready to give
their friend Mangope a hand, many of Bop's soldiers joined the
popular opposition. Some turned their guns on Mangcpe's
"guests". Others passively watched events from the sidelines.
Mangope was on his last legs. The complicated process of
constructing the new South Africa out of the political
absurdities ar.d violence of the pas; had begun in the western
Transvaal.
In fact, the collapse of acartheid in the rural areas of
the western Transvaal and ir. the counterfeit stats of
Bcputhatswana had begun much earlier. The extraordinary
r.uirJoer of atrocities that took place between 1984 ar.d 1990,
during the state of emergency, accelerated its demise. The
state and its opponents made "short work of traditions" during
this brief but highly charged period, just as Alexis de
Tocqueville claimed revolutionaries and counterrevolutionaries
did at the height of the French Revolution.
In effect, the state of emergency destroyed the legal
certainties of the apartheid era , xaking it impossible for
the judicial process to reaffirm publicly the existence of the
state by punishing the "guilty". Arrests and punishment were
carried out behind closed doors. The use of the "wet bag",
defenestrations and mutilations of genitals and limbs became
as commonplace as filling out the blank spaces on a charge
sheet. By the end of the 1980s South African Defense Force
(SADF) directly administered most of the country's cities and
towns. Civilian officials served at the pleasure of the
SADF's General Staff. General Magnus Malan succinctly stated
the position in his initial statement before the TRC,"...the
territory of the Republic of South Africa was declared an
operational area for the South African Defense Force."
But even though judging and punishing took place behind
closed doors, state sponsored violence had to be public.
Otherwise half the point of the violence carried out by the
state's security forces would have been lost. Civic
associations and neighborhood defense groups would have fcur.i
it easier to xcve into the space abdicated by civilian
administrators. How did all this wcrk in the countryside and
the fictional homelands?
The Present Meets the Past
On 6 May 1997 an African peasant farmer named L.S. or
Lizo Makganye came to testify before commissioners and
translators of the TRC at a public hearing in the town of
Zeerust. He had come to town from his nearby village to talk
atcut how he and his fellow Eafarutshe had resisted
incorporation into Bcphuthatswana, even though the ostensible
reason for his presence was to talk about how his son and
ether young people in his village had beer, unjustly arrested
ar.c tortured in 1993. ?.z one point, the conversation between
the elder Ma-'.canye and the commissioners took a turn that was
rernir.iscar.t of William Faulkner's injunction that "the cast is
never really the past":
Chairperson: You said earlier or...., that thsre was a
struggle c: the pecple of Braaklacte against in-
::r?c:a::;r. bur that was around 1989...- but this
happened in 1995. Whai was happening ir. 1993 that
made the police come back in such large numbers
back into the community and take such action against
the people?
Makganye: They did so because we did no. want to be
incorporated in Eoputhatswana.
Chairperson: But incorporation had taker, place already.
We're talking about 1993, we're not talking about 1989.
Incorporation had taken place already.
Makganye: Do you say we were incorporated in
3oputhacswana?
Chairperson: Yes.
Makganye: Do you say we were incorporated in
Boputhatswana in 1993? We didn't agree. When they,
immediately they said
we were incorporated, we did not agree. We continued with
our struggle, because we knew that there was nothing
called 3oputhatswana, it's part of South Africa.
Anomalies and contradictory conversations of this nature had
happened before in South Africa, but without the potential
political explosiveness of the 1990s.
On the afternoon of 20 April 1914, less than hundred
miles from where L.S. Makganye had his 1997 exchange and less
than a year after the Land Act had been introduced on the
floor of the Union Parliament, C.J. du Plessis, a prominent
Afrikaner farmer from the Hex River Ward of Ruster.burg, stood
up in a district courtroom and declared that, "The natives in
the Hex River Ward I think should be treated just the same as
other natives, but they have got ground, in that Ward, and it
is very difficult for me to state what should be done with
then... In the long run they will have to be shifted. They
must realize that they car.nct gc or. ss they are at present.
If Hex River were left as it is, where a white mar. or Kaffir
could buy where he liked, it would result ir. war" .
War did come, but not as du Plessis had irr.ajir.ed it.
In August 1914 the First World War broke cut. Six
months later men like du Plessis and their families
participated in or gave passive support to a rebellion
against South Africa's entry into the war and the
apparent failure of the Land Act to give them complete
control over the lives and expectations of their African
tenants and laborers. The rebellion unleashed a pogrom
against the persons and property of many Africans in the
Hex River, Zwartsruggens, and Linskana wards of
Rustenburg and Marico. Despite the bluster and violent
acts of participants in the failed rebellion, the
machinery of African dispossession continued to move too
slowly for most white farmers. The Land Act had bean a
great political victory for one segment of white
landowners, but its weak executive powers made it a
creature of the government of the day. The executive
impasse spiked corporal punishment and violence on the
farms of the Transvaal and former Orange Free State,
which, combined with Afrikaner bitterness about the
outcome of the Anglo-5cer and First World War, made for a
faint but continuous current of violence in the
countryside.
Proclamation after proclamation pointed this out--
from the 1916 Beaumcnt Commission Report to the 1939
Proclamation 31. In the 1920s, as rime Minister of the
Pact Government, J.S.M. Hertzcr sought to address the
problem by ratcheting up the number of days that an
African labor tenant was obliged to work on his
landlord's farm to 120 and by appointing one of the
principle leaders of the 1914 Rebellion, General J.C.G.
Kemp, as Minister of Agriculture. However, such measures
failed to accelerate the pace of dispossession of
Africans landowners outside the designated reserves.
Consider the closing remarks of a letter written to
Hertzog's Secretary For Native Affairs by Ernest Stubbs, the
Native Commissioner for the P.ustenburg district at the time.
Stubbs was protesting the removal of the Sub-Native
Commissioner's office from the town of Rustenburg to a more
removed area of the district:
A large proportion of the Native population is
spread among the farmers of the District. The proposed
Native Areas, it is true, are more or less situate (sic)
in the North,... but sight should not be lost of the fact
that a considerable portion of the S.N.C.'s time is
necessarily taken up in adjusting disputes and settling
questions which constantly arise between European
employers and Native employees... I do not agree that the
tendency would be for Natives to have recourse to his
office without going to lawyers, were his station at
Pilansberg. The contrary would be the case. Natives
would more than ever in the absence of an officer
carrying the status and prestige of a Sub-Native
Commissioner fall in the hands of lawyers ar.d the
litigation would be multiplied two and three fold.
White farmers in these areas felt particularly aggrieved
about the African landowners in their midst. However marginal
seme African holdings might have been, neighboring whits
farmers claimed, right up to President J.5. Vorsisr's creation
of the fraudulent state cf Bochutr.atswana ir. Derenter 19"",
that African landowners had "picked the eye; cue of the
country".
The Changing Modalities of Rural Contestation
Trading on the received wisdom about South Africa's
countryside, as well as a healthy suspicion of it, historians
of rural South Africa have depicted it variously. In one
instance it is a place of "cows and peace". In another, we
are told that occasionally it has become a stage for inter and
intra- ethnic violence. Finally, it has also been a place
where African peasant farmers and their families have
struggled quietly and ingeniously to hold on to what little
~hey have given the everbearing demands and constraints of
white domination.
Much of the testimony given to the TRC suggests that all
these capacities and conditions were present in places like
t'r.e western Transvaal at ;r.e time cr another. But their
relationship t; each other departed radically from what had
obtained previously during the course of the popular protest
of the 1990s. Such protest occasioned the growth of agrarian
versions of the urban civic associations and village level
defense committees. In Rustenburg and Marico the leadership
of the new organizations encouraged migrant workers to join as
well, so that they might stay informed about the scope and
nature of repression in the cities. Some of the rural
organizations also doubled as incipient agricultural
cooperatives and interlocutors for African farm workers on
white owned farms.
None of these developments were especially novel.
Similar happenings had taken place in Zeerust in the late
1950S/ when President Hendrik Verhoerd's government organized
a special rural division of the South African Police (SAP)
called the "Mobile Column" and attempted to foist passbooks on
rural African women. But that rural Africans were now forming
such organizations under the nose Mangope's regime and in
defiance of a sustained military state of siege made local
white farmers in Rustenburg and Marico fearful and
intransigent. They also became increasingly skeptical of the
ability of the state in all its various forms-- from Mangcpe's
Bcputhatswana to the partially the militarized South African
state under P.W. Botha and F.W. DeKlerk— to keep rural
Africans in line. After DeKierk lifted the stata of emergency
and local Africans openly expressed their support for
previously banned organisations, white landlords evictee
thousands of African families from their farm.s.
Between July and November 1991 evictions of African farm
workers and their families increased sharpiy ir. Maricc and
Rustenburg. By March 1991, they were accompanied by
intensified police crackdowns and a new recruitment drive by
the AWB and other right wing parties among local white farmers
and white mineworkers at the platinum mines near Phokeng.
From Rustenburg to Zeerust, missions and church yards of every
Christian denomination were crammed with hundreds of homeless
families.
During his 6 May 1997 testimony before the TRC, Reverend
Kevin Dowling, the Roman Catholic bishop for Rustenburg during
the 1980s and 1990s, claimed that the 600 homeless people at
St. Joseph's Mission in Rustenburg in 1991 were composed
entirely of families that had been turned off local farms.
Many local whites were violently opposed to their presence at
the mission. Intimidated by the violent threats of local
farmers and Mangope's security forces, Bishop Dowlir.g appealed
tc the SAP branch at nearby Soschhoek to help him move the 600
people in Che mission in late Noveinber. Dowling thought that
they would be safer at a place called Soitokcng. On Saturday,
22 November 1991, several days after Dcwiing had appealed to
"he police tc assist him in moving the families, St. Joseph's
was rocked by a violent explosion. Of that experience,
Icwling said:
...We heard this terrific expicsicn and we checked
the buildings.. .We did not thm>: to check cur church,
because the ye=r before, in 1390, our church and our
commercial school had been fire-combed, causing a lot
of damage, but we did not think tc check the church, only
in the morning,we found this devastation in the church.
A. powerful bomb, which the police explained tc me was
specifically designed tc cause maximum damage through
suction...The ANC martials came in that evening and one
of the things I noticed, was that a bakkie, r.o net a
bakkie, a mini-bus from one of tne mines, came in with a
whole group of White miners and they said they were
coming to see the damage to the church. The ANC martials
turned them out.
During the stats of emergency the BOP security forces gave
right wing organizations and white farmers in Marico and
Rustenburg an African countenance under which to hide. Once
the state cf emergency was lifted, such groups were obliged to
construct their own machinery of terror and retribution--
carticularlv since their own relaticnshiD to the state had
become so skewed after 1977.
The "special support" for white farmers, which had been
so frequently referred to in government force reports on
agriculture during the more halcyon days of the apartheid era,
had all but disappeared after Vorster's pronouncement of the
"independent homelands". State support for white farmers had
always had ulterior political motives. Afrikaner Nationalist
Party governments had distribut-ed state subsidies to white
farmers more with an eye toward insuring a solid block of
rural white support (by the 1970s the majority of Afrikaans
speaking whites also lived ir. cities) than improving the
productivity of agriculture or expanding the infrastructure.
It was only in the 1980s, for example, under the shadow of che
state of emergency, that ESK3M, the state electrical company,
finally completed the installation of power lines that served
those rural areas where one had the greatest concentration of
white-owned farms.
The increasing use of the tractor combine may have
reduced the dependence of white landlords on the wagcns and
plows of their African farm hands and tenants between the end
of the Second World War and the 1970s. But it was the
unrelenting legal, military and political hammer blows of the
Afrikaner Nationalist governments, combined with the forced
removal of hundreds of thousands of Africans to the arid,
unforgiving parcels of land in the so-called "Bancu
Homelands", that eventually humbled African peasant landowners
and sharecroppers. Numerous testimonies and depositions
submitted to the TRC suggest t:i - - late as 1993 the South
African government was forcing relatively self-sufficient
African farmers in Marico and Rustenburg's "black spots" off
their land with the armed might of the SADF.
Courage and perseverance have never been in short supply
among Africans in the western Transvaal, but the terror that
accompanied the state of emergency challenged even the most
courageous and resilient. The experience pushed many such
people to the breaking point. On 7 May 1997, Louisa M.
Maiebo, the former.recording secretary for the Peoples'
Progressive Party (PPP) in Rusrenburg, recalled her arrest
and imprisonment in April 1963, three months after Mangope's
brief overthrow and subsequent restoration:
I stayed fourteen days in the cell, that is in
Fhokang. They released me and we never went to court. I
Cher, came home. Frcm that time, I lived under severe
conditions. They became che norm. A week would go by and
the following [week?; Z would be arrested. : did not
have, I did net live a normal life.
The PPP came ir.tc being in 1985, just after the South
African President, P.W. Botha, declared a state of emergency.
Meanwhile Mangope's government was bent en removing Lebone
Mcloklegle from the chieftaincy of the Bophokeng Tswana .
Lebcne's chieftaincy had also inadvertently become associated
with those Bophokeng who disputed Phokeng's connection to
Boputhatswana. The PPP's leadership, particularly Mrs. Molebo
and Rocky Malabane Metsing, made up an important segment of
these who insisted that the connection had no legitimacy.
Despite the claims and assertions of Mangope's security forces
as they tortured her in the Phokeng Civic Center, Mrs. Malebo
insisted that the connection between the PPP and the deposed
chief was, at best, symbolic.
The increasing cooperation among young, militant members
of various African liberation organizations and their middle
aged counterparts in the Transvaal's countryside was quite
real, however. Testimonies taken between 1996 and 1997 from a
number of rural Africans in the vicinity of Marico and
Rustenburg suggest that a coalescence among the rank and file
of various liberation groups, which had been forged in the
local defense committees and civic associations, assumed a
mature form after the lifting of the state of emergency in
1991. Was this coalescence a generational phenomenon? Many
aspects of it certainly were. The experiences cf activists
during the late 1970s and 1980s, particularly thosa associated
with the protests that accompanied the funerals of activists
who had been targeted durir.g the military crackdown, had wiped
the slate clear..
As numerous depositions made before the TP.C demonstrated,
the apparent differences among groups like the ANC and Pan
African Congress (PAC) had become irrelevant i~ the facs of
the state's massive show of force in Rustenburg and Marico.
The energy and ingenuity of youthful rank and file members of
these organizations fed the growth of village defense
committees and phiris or "action committees". This was
particularly so in the so-called "black spots", where large
numbers of people resisted incorporation into Eophuthatswana
in spite of the occupation of their communities by SADF troops
and Mangope's security forces. In 1989 and 1990, on the eve of
the unbanning of the ANC and the other liberation groups/
clashes between the SADF and Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), as well
as less formally designated armed groups, at Lamutso, Singh
and Ramaquane heartened and inspired local people. Soon a
loose network of village defense committees extended from
Weigedacht to Saulspoort.
But many rural communities in Marico and Rustenburg paid
dearly for the lack of coordination among the village defense
corrjirjnities. L.S. Makgar.ye, who testified before TRC
cc.Tjnissior.ers at Zeerust on 6 May 19S~, knew full well how
'r.i.z'r. that price ccula be. On 1-1 April 1993, Mr. Makganye's
s:r. "Snowball" was arrestsd, imprisoned and tortured to the
czLnz of permanent mutilation by Eop pel icemen, after he had
ccr.versed 5 meeting in the re;t:ry of the Anglicar. church near
his village. Sr.cwcail Makgar.ye and several ether ycung men of
his village, which was situated between Mabutastac and the
border with Botswana, had formed an agricultural cooperative
called the Boskop Project. But they had organized the
cccperative, which sought to breed cattle, seii eggs, and
share plows, at the very moment that Lucas Mangope was bent on
demonstrating to anxious white farmers that the upcoming
elections would not make him redundant.
Torture and peremptory detention were Mangope's last
trump cards. True to form, he played them inhamfisted
fashion. According to L.S. Makganye, Mangope's policemen, and
perhaps some SADF reserve units, attacked his village on the
night before his son's arraignment:
During that same night they came with teargas. All
these soldiers encompassed our village and shot us with
teargas and others were crippled... It's not only my son
that are crippled. When we asked they just said, they
just told us that whoever is adamant and doesn't want to
take the authority of Boputhatswana must leave but we
denied to leave and we are still in our own land. White
people took our land whilst they found us being there.
They would come and camp near our village where we were
staying before... When you tried to go to the government
in Eeerust's offices, ...when you arrived they would just
say, our government has spoken in Pretoria that you
should leave because your areas are black spots.
When the senior Makganye had completed this portion of his
statement, the commissioner and translator mildly admonished
him by saying" We just wanted to hear about what you have
written in your statement, but now you are telling us about
the land." He was at pains to see hew one could separate the
two "events", for why else and at whose behest had the
soldiers come? The war that C. J. du Plessis had speculated
or. in 1914 had finally arrived.
Conclusion
In 1977, in the midst of urban uprisings in Soweto and
other African townships, President J.B. Vorster's burlesque
declaration of "statehood" for entities like Bophuthatswana
bought time for apartheid. But with the onset of the state of
emergency1 Mangope's influence declined steadily in the rural
areas. This decline culminated with the short lived military
coup of 12-13 February 1938.
After he had been restored to power by the SADF and had
his restoraticr. affirmed by the brief visit of P.W. Botha,
Mangope's power was confined to Mmabatho, the prison and
police barracks at Montswedi outside Zeerust, and the secret
prison and torture chairier inside the Phokeng Civic Center.
Armed violer.ee and sustained contentious collective action by
z'r.e village defense co-.v.it-iaes had discounted the merits of
collaboration. The mutinies in Bop's army and the general
meltdown of its civilian administration by the lace 1980s was
proof of this. The defense committees had also exposed the
cracks and tensions in relations between the state and white
farmers. The violence in the countryside during the state of
emergency made manifest the fiction of "independent
homelands", even to those officials who strove mightily to
maintain it. Violence in the countryside had become something
just short of a political solvent on the eve of the 1994
elections.
Violence and aggression in any society automatically
embrace related problems of social and political costs,
morality, social cohesion and authority— in short, who,
through the agency of the state, can do violence to others?
Secondly, because there is no known human society where
violence and aggression do not occur and because the range of
expression of aggression can vary-- from a hostile glance to
the extermination of entire segments of a population-- it is
mere useful to think of violence in terms of capacities rather
instincts.
Actual acts of terror and their perpetrators only amount
to the most obvious aspects of the problem. The tragic
dimensions of this kind of human experience have often been
submerged beneath the jargon of the social sciences. Terror
and violence do not constitute political prcgrains in
themselves, but they dc give poignancy to political choices
made by the discrete groups of people in question.
The new South Africa is still in the making, and it will
be some time before that process is completed. The T?,C
dG**srTiinsd to examine this ^r^ces5- VP ^ ^ a ni.eacui~ca *^* rop° bu*~
without illusions. By helping to "make short work of
traditions", it has made impossible to understand South
Africa's past as a series of shibboleths or coincidental
misfortunes. For that, we have both the living and the dead
to thank— especially the dead.
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Case JB3633, John M. Makgatlanyane, c May 199", Zeerust
Case JB3682, Johanna M. Mcitoi, 6 May 1997, Seerust
Case JB3542, Lillian M, Kadi, 6 May 1997, Zeerust
Case JB3684, Piet M. Lamoia, 6 May 1997, Zeerust
Case JB0716, L.S. Makganye, 6 May 1997, Zeerusc
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